This study provides estimation of public implicit guarantees over the period 1997 until 2012 using a rating-based model. The investigation focuses on a sample of 45 large listed European banks. It appears that the main element for determining the value of the public subsidy is the intrinsic strength of the bank. In addition, we bring evidence on the importance of the guarantor strength on the value of the implicit guarantee: a higher sovereign rating of a bank's home country leads to larger implicit subsidies for banks' debt. Our findings also suggest that the recently observed decrease in the value of implicit subsidies goes beyond the declining in European sovereigns' strength. Rather, it is consistent with the implementation of resolution regimes and practices moving from a "bail-out" resolution policy to "bail-in" recapitalization. Bank insolvencies would be handled in a more explicit context therefore expectations on implicit public support are reduced.
Introduction and summary
The financial crisis that peaked in 2008 brings into light a lot of financial system inadequacies, to be address by the financial regulators and related academicians. In particular, it raised questions that were discussed only marginally before. Beyond the need to restructure the current regulatory framework in order to improve the liquidity and capital adequacy for financial institutions, governments had to approve and support large fiscal packages to prevent the risk of run-over of banks in the distressed financial system, acting as a "guarantor of last resort". Therefore, unprecedented amounts of public money have been injected in banking systems in order to prevent banks' failure. In turn, this highlights objectively the importance of "implicit guarantees" given by government for the distressed financial system. Public authorities' reaction to the crisis focuses on particular characteristic of the banking system: the activity of certain banks is essential and irreplaceable for the whole economic activity, mainly due to their size and interconnections with other sectors of the economy.
In other words, the estimated cost of liquidation for such "systemically-important" financial institutions is so high that public authorities' can not overlook the funding needs of such banks' in times of stress. Thus, the risk of default for financial institutions' considered as "too-big-to-fail" or "too-interconnected-to-fail", can be reduced by the (near) certainty as the government will support them in order to avoid their bankruptcy and greater financial and social distress. Therefore, support activities by government authorities provide significant advantages for these beneficiary banks. First, the expectation of public guarantee leads to an increase in the value of the affected debt relative to non-beneficiary banks or corporate entities from other sectors. Second, they gain access to funding markets and to cheaper resources since the banks' effective risk exposure will be limited. Consequently, the risk premiums paid to investors in banks' debt do not reflect the losses they would have incurred in case of default of the bank. Therefore, this results in a funding cost advantage for beneficiary banks although the guarantee itself is "implicit". Our main objective is to quantify the value of the implicit support for banks and to determine its major determinants. We test to which extent the capacity and the willingness of the government and the existent regulations affect the value of implicit subsidies for a sample of European banks.
We focus on European banks as our topic has a major interest in the new context of the creation of a Monetary Union in Europe. To the extent that this subvention is tacit, there is no ex-ante commitment either a concrete evaluation method. Recent empirical literature focuses on American and Anglo-Saxon banks to analyze implicit subsidies for their risky debt. Divergences between estimates come from different evaluation methods used by the authors. Oxera (2011) assess the value of implicit subsidy for the British banks using a contingent claims model. He calculates the expected amount that the government will need to inject in order to prevent the default of the bank as the drop in bank's future asset value beyond a given threshold. However, in a comparative study for different approaches, Noss and Sowerbutts (2012) conclude on an overestimation made with the contingent claims model in implicit guarantee evaluation. In our paper, we employ a rating based approach, in order to implement both an assessment and an empirical framework, for implicit public guarantees due to several reasons: firstly, it allows for a forward-looking estimation of the government intervention that is not taking into account in a size-based approach. Secondly, comparing with a contingent claims model, using a rating based approach allows us to account only for government subsidies and exclude for deposit or parental guarantees 1 .
Although, the rating based approach avoids critics on dynamic modeling of bank's future asset value and their computed statistical distribution. The rating data issued by Moody's is matched with annual balance-sheet and income-statement data from Bankscope. The paper quantifies the value of implicit guarantees for a sample of 45 large listed European banks from 17 counties over the period of 1997 to 2012. Since the start of the financial crisis, more precisely from 2007 to 2009, huge amounts of public money were injected into the European banking systems. Our estimations confirm historical values of the implicit guarantees calculated as a spread between an intrinsic rating and a global rating (including government support) during these years. Therefore, as a first step of our empirical analysis, 1 The predicted value of the government intervention is calculated as the amount needed to insure the value of all liabilities of a bank. Thus it can also capture the deposits' explicit guarantees. Another constraint of the contingent claims approach is the modeling of the total assets value which supposes an estimation of the correlation between the assets of individual banks. However, this dataset is not available for academic studies. the paper explains why some banks receive greater implicit subsidies as compared to others?
As a second step of our empirical analysis, we test to which extent the financial strength of guarantor (government) affect the value of implicit guarantees. Our approach is inspired from Estrella and Schich (2012) . Comparing to their work, we use more control variables in order to better explain the evolution of the dependent variable. Our intuition comes from recent tensions for sovereign debt markets that are at least consistent with both the evolution of their balance sheet structure and the reduction in the value of implicit subsidy.
We quantify this as a "supply" effect for public subsidies. Furthermore, recent decrease in the value of implicit subsidies for banks' risky debt is consistent with new regulatory and resolution practices that are to be implemented in European countries. These coordination efforts anticipate the development of a cross-border resolution mechanism for bank failure within the European Banking Union. According to these practices, unsecured debt holders will incur losses in case of a bank failure (Schich and Kim, 2012) . Thus, such debt holders anticipate weaker intervention and willingness from governments' to support risky debt of distressed banks. As a result, we expect that it will reduce the value of implicit guarantees as well as banking system distortions are reduced. Our paper contributes to the literature by considering the simultaneous effect of 'demand' and 'supply' for the implicit public guarantees for banks' debt. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background information about implicit public guarantees. Section 3 describes dataset and the methodology employed. Section 4 reports empirical analysis and the main results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Implicit public guarantees
In general, guarantees can be considered as "strategic" instrument since they provide consumer protection and stability, as well as facilitate access to market funds. If the pricing is appropriate, they can be efficient and thus, their existence does not induce a moral hazard problem. Moreover, for explicit guarantees, the insurer can elaborate transparent and equilibrated contracts. We cannot say the same about "implicit" guarantees. As the name indicates, there is no ex-ante legal and explicit commitment for these guarantees and in most of the cases the amount is not made public. Therefore there are no premiums paid in return. From an economic point of view, the fact that a bank can benefit from a government support without actually paying any corresponding fees, allows us to analyze this "government protection" as a subvention. More explicitly, the implicit guarantees could be defined by the expectation that the government will provide a bailout in case of financial distress.
Hence, implicit public guarantees represent a transfer of resources from the government to the benefit of banking sector in order to avoid bankruptcies. The public support can be materialized by liquidity injections or repurchase of banks' risky assets. The crisis highlighted that there was a public willingness to support especially "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) or "too-interconnected-to-fail" financial institutions. Although costly for governments and taxpayers, banks' public recapitalizations could be explained by a simple (and 'rational') calculation. In the case of a crisis, bank losses in bankruptcy would most likely to be higher than the cost of an ex-ante public punctual support. Based on the doctrine that the government will not allow large banks to fail since their failure would cause significant disruption to the whole economic activity, implicit guarantees become a real source of moral hazard.
The crisis highlighted that several categories of investors took benefit from the public guarantee, from the low-risk debt holders (senior debt holders) to subordinated debt-holders.
This distortion affects market discipline as investors would have no longer the incentive to supervise banks risk-taking behavior. Moreover, after the crisis, an even larger problem emerged. Banks that benefitted from public subsidies became "too-systemically importantto-fail". The main source of this distortion comes from the funding cost advantage induced by the reduced probability of default and lower risk premiums paid to investors for the beneficiary banks relative to non-beneficiary ones. Therefore, market participants view this implicit government guarantee phenomena no longer as a myth, but more as a reality. It is essential to quantify and analyze these distortions for future policy implications.
Quantifying implicit public guarantees
As the name indicates, "implicit", there is no established measure for the public implicit guarantees. Empirical studies and methodological reflection for quantifying implicit guarantees for banks' debt experienced a new dimension after Lehman Brothers default in 2008 and most of the following literature focused on British and US banks. Early literature measured the implicit guarantees as a funding cost difference between a privileged bank and a non privileged bank or financial corporation (Kwast and Passmore (2000) , Soussa (2000) , Baker and McArthur (2009) ). Later literature looks up both to quantify the value of implicit guarantees and analyze their effect on funding cost. We are focusing on the European banks as they represent an interesting case study for our analysis. Firstly, because of interactions emerged during the financial crisis between banking and public debt. Secondly, due to the essential role that banks and the whole banking sector plays in the European economic activity. The structure of European banking sector represents a key element in our methodology as banks plays an important role in the economic activity. Lastly, the study of implicit government guaranties is essential in the context of a restructuring regulation and for the implementation of new resolution mechanism. The issue of the creation of a Banking Union stimulates more interest in studying the distortions characterizing European banking systems. To our knowledge there is no academic study focusing on a sample of European large banks. Two main estimation methodologies can be distinguished in the literature.
First, a funding advantage model that estimates the implicit subsidy as a reduction in the cost of funding due to public protection in distress. Within this model, a size or/and a rating based approach are employed. Using a rating based approach, Haldane (2009 Haldane ( , 2010 In a more refined study, Ueda and di Mauro (IMF, 2012) highlight an increased advantage 2 £40 billion (Noss and Sowerbutts, 2012) of the public support between 2007 (60 bp) and 2009 (80 bp) . With the second model, called contingent claims model, the amount of public resources needed to prevent a bank failure is evaluated as the shortfall in asset value compared to a given threshold 3 . Using this approach, Oxera (2011) evaluates the annual amount of implicit government guarantees for English banks to be more than $120 billion. This second method is much more complex as it requires the modeling of the future distribution of banks' assets, thus it is very sensitive to modeling assumptions.
Data
The main data used in our study is composed of bank ratings provided by Moody's. We retain two main ratings: an "all-in" rating accounting for global strength of the bank and a "stand-alone" rating describing banks' intrinsic strength. Both represent an assessment of banks' ability to meet its commitments on time, but only the second one excludes all external support. Thus, the difference between these two ratings measured in number of notches represents our value of expected implicit public guarantee for banks' debt. We use ratings for a sample of 45 large listed European banks from 16 countries in order to quantify the value of implicit public guarantees over the period of 1997 to 2012. Among the three main rating agencies, financial ratings assigned to banks vary significantly. We retain Moody's ratings for reasons of data availability and rating methodology transparency 4 .
However, there are different starting dates on which European banks have been rated.
Thus an unbalanced panel of 627 observations will be used in this analysis. In order to use the ratings described above in our empirical analysis we assign numerical values to each qualitative assessment. The Long-Term Deposit Rating (foreign currency) counting for the global rating, rated from Aaa to C3. We assign numerical values from 1 to 25, with 1 accounting for the highest rating (Aaa). The intrinsic rating designed by the Bank 3 This threshold is given by the future value of the capital requirements ratio. A set of assumption is to be made under this approach (Oxera, 2011) .
4 Our choice is based on studies of Van Roy and Vespro (2012) and Tarashev and Packer (2011) analyzing different methodologies used by the three major rating agencies, Moody's, Fitch and Standard&Poor's. We dispose of larger database with Moody's than the two others rating agencies.
Financial Strength Rating excludes all external support 5 . This rating's scale runs from A to E. We assign numerical values from 1 to 14 for this rating, with 1 denoting the best quality intrinsic capacity (A). Appendix A defines and describes the main ratings for banks.
We also use sovereign ratings, again, provided by Moody's. They serve as an explanatory variable in our second section and represent an assessment of the sovereigns' ability to provide support to banking sector in time of distress. It also provides general control for macroeconomic environment of our sample of countries. The scale for sovereign ratings is the same as for the global rating, varying from Aaa to C3. Numerical value of 1 is considered as the best quality of public debt (Aaa) denoting higher capacity of support.
Besides rating database manually collected from Moody's, accounting data is used in order to explain banks' structure and their business model. Balance-sheet and income statement data on an annual base is taken from Bankscope.
Methodology
Given that our outcome variable is not directly observable, we are going to compute it using a rating based approach. It has several advantages relative to other models. A size based approach, for example, includes no relative appreciation of banks risk besides the size effect, thus it considers that only large banks can benefit from public guarantees. Contrary to this method, the rating model has the advantage of a better assessment of the risk as it is already incorporated in Moody's judgment and a forward-looking evaluation of the likelihood of receiving government protection. Moreover, ratings are largely used in bond pricing as an appraisal on the involved risk. Relatively to a contingent claims approach, the rating model allows easier and more transparent implementation. The modeling of banks' assets is based on strong assumptions and at the same time, requires the estimation of a correlation between different assets held by an individual bank. Thus, such data is not publicly available. In our study, we are going to apply our analysis to a sample of large listed European banks. Therefore, the implicit subsidy provided by government is computed as the difference in notches between the intrinsic and the global rating 6 . The calculated value of implicit guarantee of a bank represents an assessment of the probability to receive government support. Appendix B reports a detailed description of the evolution of implicit government guarantees. We notice a significant evolution in 2007 when public guarantees reach historical values. However, since 2010 the value of public subsidies decreased. From an econometrical point of view, the nature of our analysis itself suggests that cross section estimations could be problematic for endogeneity reasons. The main sources of endogeneity that can cause biasedness in our estimates generally fall under three categories: omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement errors (Wooldridge, 2002) . For our analysis, we consider that the most disturbing source of endogenity could be the omitted variables.
We can explain this issue by the implicit nature of our dependant variable, the public subsidy. For this reason, several econometrical specifications will be tested. Finally, used fixed effects panel approach for a sample of Europeans banks corrects for the endogeneity bias. Furthermore, this econometric specification allows us to account for possible bias from correlations among the unobserved effects and the observed country heterogeneity.
Empirical analysis and main results
The main objective of our analysis is to determine how banks' characteristics could explain differences in the value of implicit guarantees received from the public authority and to examine to what extent implicit guarantees can be explained by the domestic economic and regulatory environment of a country. Our first main intuition is that the intrinsic strength of a bank is the most important "demand effect" for the implicit subsidy. Second, we will test if the willingness of the government to support the debt of the bank is stronger than the regulatory constraint.
Why certain banks receive greater implicit subsidies?
In general, ratings are opinions about the creditworthiness of a corporate, reflecting both quantitative risk assessments and a subjective evaluation of a rating agency on the expected amount of losses that the entity could incur in the future (Moody's Investors Service, 2007 . However, there is no explicit rule or formally detailed methodology that can explain financial, non-financial or sovereign ratings. A common practice of main rating agencies is to assess quantitative coefficients to different rating criteria and thus compute an average score that serves as rating. For example, in the case of banks, for the Financial Strength rating, Moody's takes into account several factors as: the risk positioning, the financial fundamentals, and operating and environmental factors. However, the numerical coefficient assessed to each of these factors can vary among banks globally in several important ways.
Moreover, the analyst's interpretation of such metrics provides further insight and analysis and putting a subjective sense in the rating process. Our main intuition is that precisely this subjective evaluation of banks' strength could contain additional information about the probability of receiving public support in time of distress. It concerns also a subjective appreciation on the future benefit of the rated bank. In this section, the paper tries to explain why some banks receive greater implicit guarantees from public authorities, as well as which are the non-explicit factors that cause the release of the public guarantees for some banks and not for others? In a first stage, we explain to what extent the intrinsic strength of banks influence the value of implicit guarantees that the government offers to banks.
Intuitively, the implicit guarantee should be a negative function of the bank capitalization as banks with a higher loss-absorbency capacity (high capital ratio) will be more stable (Kashyap and Stein (2010) ) since better capitalized banks will need (ask) a weaker public intervention in times of distress (BCBS, 2011) . Thus, the funding structure is essential as it represents an important source of information on bank's stability. Nevertheless, asset structure is indispensable for bank risk assessment (Hau and al., 2012) . For example, bank's liquidity is revealed as an important factor for bank loss assessments during the crisis as they faced funding stress. The amount of liquid assets brings an evaluation of bank's capacity to meet its maturities using its liquid resources (Moody's (2013) ). As intrinsic rating captures the data on banks' balance-sheet structure, taking it as a control variable allows us to eliminate the initial state of bank's risk. So, we are going to explain the implicit guarantees by estimating the intrinsic risk of the bank. Moreover, we notice that we cannot consider for a linear relationship between the values of implicit guarantee (IG) and of the intrinsic rating (IR) as the rating spread is not the same for banks in the same rating class 7 .
For this reason, we take the squared term on intrinsic rating as an explanatory variable (IR 2 ). Furthermore, after regressing implicit guarantee on "initial" risk state, we explain why the value of implicit guarantees 8 varies within banks in our sample. Relative to the insurance market, where we can observe supply and demand of insurance contracts, we can consider that the intrinsic risk of the bank represents the "demand" for implicit public guarantees and therefore, the government will play the role of the "supplier" of implicit public guarantees. Our econometrical specification posits that the implicit guarantee for the bank i at the time t is given by:
where Crisis is a binary variable that controls for global crisis or\ and sharp changes in the value of our explanatory variables. It takes the value 1 for the crisis period, 2007-2012 (0 otherwise). We consider X a vector of control variables that can affect the value of implicit guarantees. It accounts for other implicit factors that can have a direct effect on public guarantees for banks: the balance-sheet size, the systemic importance of the bank, the balance-sheet liquidity and also the business model of the bank. The residual term includes time invariant bank specific effect α i and a random error term it . Table 4 in Appendix C reports the results from estimating our fixed effects estimation. Column 1 reports the results from our baseline regression, explaining the implicit guarantees with the intrinsic rating of the bank. Taking into account this estimation, the implicit guarantee can be presented as: From this estimation, we determine the direct relationship between the value of implicit guarantees and the intrinsic strength of the banks. The results highlight an increasing and concave relationship. Thus, the maximum of the estimated function corresponds to an intrinsic rating of D (ie. numerical value of 10). This means that banks being rated beyond D receive fewer public guarantees in absolute value than banks with a better quality of intrinsic strength. This also means that the guarantor (sovereign) has no incentive to support the banks with weaker intrinsic strength as the associated risk of default is too high. The function between implicit public guarantees and the intrinsic strength of banks is confirmed by the estimation that takes into account the risk class to which each intrinsic rating belongs. Second and third columns report the results for estimations that account for other banks' characteristics: the business model and balance-sheet liquidity. While the liquidity is never a significant explanatory variable for the value of the implicit guarantee, the business model is significant only during the crisis 9 . The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable Business model x Crisis is negative and highly significant showing that, during the crisis, public authorities seem to take into account the commercial activity of the bank ("traditional" activity of lending and deposits collection). Other bank characteristics could definitively influence public authority decision to intervene in order to avoid a bank's default. The size of the bank (column 6) and even more its' systemic importance (column 5) could be essential elements for the distribution of public implicit guarantees. Banks' interconnections proved to be a trigger point for negative shocks during the crisis so for systemically important institutions there is a stronger probability of government support than for medium and small banks. Therefore, for banks categorized as TBTF or TITF, the default risk is reduced by the quasi-certainty that the government will support banks in order to avoid bankruptcy. Finally, the results reported in column 9 highlight that the intrinsic strength of banks represents the principal factor to take into consideration when financial executives make anticipations on the probability of government intervention to support banks in times of distress. When controlling for other characteristics of banks, the impact of intrinsic rating on public guarantees is relatively the same.
Alternative regressions
Since each point in the empirical distribution of our dependent variable (Implicit guarantee) is calculated as a spread of two ratings. Therefore, our data is intrinsically integer-valued.
In that case, it would be reasonable to use a Poisson regression for our empirical analysis applied to a sample of European banks. The Poisson regression model considers the equality between the conditional mean and conditional variance of the dependent variable. According to our model, the mean and the variance of the Implicit guarantee should be the same within each cluster of banks. We test this assumption using a negative binomial distribution which allows for over-dispersion in the dependent variable. We first implement a Poisson regression to our empirical model. Table 5 in Appendix C reports results for the Poisson regression equivalent to the econometric specification (1a). Estimated coefficients confirm previous results on the impact of intrinsic risk of the banks on the expected public guarantee for banks' debt. The chisquared "goodness-of-fit" tests whether the model fits our data. The paper concludes that the model fits reasonably well our data as the test is not statistically significant (Prob > chi2 (582) above the threshold of 0.05). In the next step, to check for over-dispersion parameter alpha, we will estimate the same model using a negative binomial distribution.
Results are reported in Table 6 in Appendix. The over-dispersion alpha coefficient suggests that negative binomial regression does not fit the data as well as the Poisson regression, thus the preferred model for the robustness check for our fixed effects model is the Poisson regression. However, this approach will be considered as a robustness check for the fixed effects model, used previously for several reasons. First, Implicit guarantee distribution involves also negative values . Thus, in order to run Poisson regressions for our sample we must ignore those negative values 10 . This is why we prefer fixed effects model. Second, by comparing the amount of variance of Implicit guarantee explained by the main predictor, the Intrinsic rating, we notice that the R2 for the fixed effect model is greater than the one for the Poisson model. This means that the fixed effects can explain better the variation of the implicit guarantee for each of the alternative regressions.
4.3 Interconnections between banks and sovereign debt. Implications on implicit government guarantees.
European financial and sovereign crisis highlighted that corporate ratings are influenced by sovereign ratings. Hau and al. (2012) show that sensitivity of long-term bank ratings changes to sovereign rating changes depend upon economic cycle and countries' economic conditions. In particular, two main sources of the interactions between bank risky debt and sovereign debt should be discussed. The first one is given by the structure of banks'
assets. In times of distress, banks tend to increase their exposure to sovereign debt in order to preserve the value and the liquidity of their assets. The crisis put a sharp spotlight on banks' asset structure, especially on the exposure on domestic but also on other European countries debt. Meanwhile, the second source of interactions comes from public authorities' capacity to support banks' risky debt. Responding to 2007 financial crisis, governments acted as a "guarantor of last resort" of the banking system. Thus, governments' reaction to shocks boosted public debt and destabilized the budgetary policy. Our study contributes to the literature on interactions between banking and sovereign debt in a way that it analyzes the extent to which sovereign strength influences the value of implicit public guarantees offered to banks. For this purpose, we use country ratings in order to explain recent fluctuation in the value of implicit guarantees as it captures both the strength of the domestic government and the economic conditions. These factors could be essential for the "supply" effect of implicit public guarantees. An important breakpoint can be observed in the evolution of sovereign debt rating in 2009 when several European countries were downgraded by the main rating agencies. Their downward reevaluation could induce additional risk firstly for the banking sector and secondly for the whole economic activity by the fact that weakened financial capacity of European governments might affect the ability to guarantee banks' debt. Therefore, the value of expected guarantees could be reduced. To test this framework, we first evaluate the correlation between the Intrinsic and the Sovereign ratings to decide if they can be simultaneously estimated in a same model. Table 7 in Appendix D
shows the estimation details. We notice that the effect of one explanatory variable does not significantly influence the effect of the second (column 3). Thus, we can test the weights of the two main predictors on the variation of implicit public guarantees: a "demand" effect coming from the bank i and a "supply" effect coming from the guarantor. Thus, the framework, proposes to test the impact of sovereign strength, beyond the effect that is already taken into consideration by the intrinsic rating, on implicit subsidies. The econometric specification in a panel setting is:
Where Soverg is the rating for the domestic country of the bank i at the period t, X a matrix of control variables 11 and v it the residual term that can be decomposed into an individual time-invariant fixed effect β i and a random effect it . Column (1) in Table 10 provides the results of estimating the Implicit guarantee on both intrinsic risk of the bank (IR) and financial strength of the guarantor (Soverg). As indicated, the negative and highly significant coefficient of the sovereign rating suggests that the strength of the guarantor is 11 The vector of predictors X contains: banks' business model, size and systemic importance. We also integrate the cross-variable Business-model x Crisis.
an important determinant of implicit guarantees for banks' debt. The main justification for this result is that the governments under distress (corresponding to a higher numerical value associated to ratings) will have a weaker capacity to support the banking system.
As a consequence, the expected value of public support will decrease by β 3 =0.451 notches when sovereign rating is downgraded by one notch 12 . Moreover, the interaction variable, denoting the influence of sovereign ratings on implicit guarantees during the crisis, confirms the previous results (last column). However, comparing to Ueda and di Mauro (2012), we control for any possible variation of the initial intrinsic value of banks' balance-sheet due to anticipations on public interventions. The results presented in the last column in the Table 10 show that, apart from the main variables already discussed above, the size of the bank's balance-sheet and moreover the systemic importance of the bank represents essential elements in defining expectations of public interventions. This empirical analysis concludes the fact that implicit public guarantees for banks' debt vary with the banks' balance-sheet structure and business model, but also with the capacity of the guarantor (the government) to support banks in times of distress: the implicit guarantee for banks' debt is higher, the stronger the financial strength of the government. Therefore, sovereign downgrades, observed especially in 2009 and 2010, explain the reduction of implicit government guarantees offered to the banking sector. This result has also important policy implications. The existence of such interconnections between bank and public debt represent a considerable source of contagion especially for negative shocks. This was a key element in the European sovereign crisis when a two-way transmission channel brought to the fore. In order to avoid market distortions and to limit the doctrine of implicit public support in case of financial distress, both national and supra-national efforts should be made. A first recommendation will be to make these public guarantees more explicit and to harmonize fee setting structures across European countries. Hence, premium charges on such guarantees should take into account the borrowers' intrinsic risk and also governments' own creditworthiness. But European banks have rather an internationalized activity. Therefore, the harmonization of such solution should also have across-border dimension. Another recommendation concerns 12 And so the numerical value of the sovereign rating is increasing by one.
recent efforts made at a European level to move from a "bail-out" resolution policy to a more "bail-in" strategy. This issue will be treated in next section.
New resolution regimes and their impact on implicit guarantees.
We previously showed that the value of implicit public guarantees depends on both the intrinsic risk of the banks and the support capacity of the public authority. Thus the recent drop in the value of the implicit guarantees can be partially explained by budgetary imbalances of European countries and sovereign ratings downgrades. However, the observed decline in the value of our dependent variable could be consistent with the very recent project of resolution regimes. "If the crisis has taught a single lesson, it is that the too-big-to-fail problem must be resolved", declared the ex-U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, in 2010. European supervisory authorities became aware of this issue and of the excessive government support offered to banking systems during the crisis. Since then, both national supervisory authorities and European committees fixed objectives on resolution regimes' implementation. A resolution mechanism is supposed to establish a priority order for debt and shareholders in case of liquidation, while improving the capacity of the banking system to absorb losses and taxpayers' protection. This initiative embodies the major consequence of an absence of resolution instruments for policymakers during the crisis and massive public support for their domestic banks during the financial crisis, materialized in an inefficient market discipline (Marquez et al., 2013) . Therefore, our intuition is that the reduction of the implicit government guarantees recorded from 2009 goes beyond the sovereign ratings downgrades, and highlights the potential negative impact of the current efforts of resolution mechanism issued within the European countries. The insight founds on investors' anticipation on lower (and limited) public interventions to rescue banks in times of severe disturbances as a result of more stringent legislation. The adopted propositions differ according to banking system development and its composition but also to historical structural factors. Between 2009 and 2012 several European countries advanced the implementation of resolution regimes for the purpose of reduction the public support accorded to banks in distress through so-called "bail-out". They propose a transition from "bail-out" (banks' recapitalization by public support) to "bail-in" (banks' recapitalization by shareholders and creditors funds mobilization) practices. The table in Appendix E shows the major advancements on such resolution schemes implementation for European countries. To implement the impact of resolution regimes on implicit guarantees public in our empirical framework, we introduce a dummy variable called Resolution−mechanism. Having a resolution regime in place or a proposition of future implementation of such a mechanism in a country j at the period t, is translated by a value one of our control variable, Resolution-mechanism jt 13 .
We postulate the following equation:
Where Y it represents a vector of characteristics 14 of t bank i at time t and S j a vector of structural factors characterizing the supervisory and regulatory framework in country j. We added these control variables in our econometric specification in order to count for country specific factors that could influence the implementation of resolution mechanism and so the probability of government intervention in time of stress for banks. v it is the error term which includes country specific effects δ i and random error it . Table 12 in Appendix reports results for our estimations. The main result of this empirical analysis is that, beyond the "demand" (intrinsic strength of the bank) and the "supply" effect (public authority's capacity to support banks in distress), we measure the willingness of public authority to support banks in distress. The estimated coefficient δ 2 displayed in the column (1) highlights the negative impact of resolution regimes on the value of implicit guarantees. This means that investors expect lower public support for banks' debt in countries where efforts (Table 11) .
14 The vector of banks' characteristics, Y, includes the banks' Intrinsic rating and it squared value, but also the banks' size and systemically-importance.
to implement a resolution mechanism were already made. Moreover, results presented in column (2) indicate that potential interactions between the sovereign rating and the introduction of resolution mechanism reduce significantly the implicit guarantees for bank debt during the crisis. Nonetheless, this could be associated to consequences of turbulent times for banking and sovereign debt and policy reactions. A significant drop in the value of implicit guarantee for Danish banks is observed in 2011. This could be explained by the implementation of a system for winding up distressed banks. Danish government decided to apply haircuts to senior creditors and thus two banks were in default 15 . Consequently, the government decision seemed to be efficient as it reduced investors' anticipations on the amount of state support. However, impact on implicit guarantees is conditional to a high level of transparency and credibility of public authorities' actions. In a next step we control precisely for the legislative and regulatory structure in each country of our panel.
We intend to eliminate any confusion on the pure impact of resolution practices on implicit subsidies and also to test for implicit guarantee sensitivity to national banking systems' structure. Thus, we account for several variables, country specific characteristics that are not considered in rating agencies assessments neither in resolution regimes. We test initially the impact of restrictions on bank activities (column 5) 16 as diversified and big banks are likely to enjoy more public subsidy than small banks. Secondly, we test if the ability of private agents to monitor and discipline banks has an additional impact on implicit guarantees (column 6). After that the supervisory power (column 7) effect is introduced in the regression and, finally, the level of protection on creditors 17 (column 8). From these four main structural and legislative factors, only Market discipline and Supervisory power are econometrically significant in explaining the variation of public guarantees. Weaker values of Market discipline indicate better transparency and private monitoring. Thus, the estimated coefficient being positive and highly significant, indicates that in countries with improved transparency and a better capacity of private monitoring, weaker public 15 Amagerbanken went down on 6 February, and Fjordbank Mors on 26 June. 16 Restrictions on bank activities, Market discipline and Supervisory power are structural indexes provided by ab, 2003 .
17 This index issued by La al. (1997, 1998) aggregates different creditors rights: protection of existing creditors in case of reorganization, hierarchy in distribution of rights in case of bankruptcy, restrictions imposed to creditors etc. It is ranged on a scale from zero to four. support for banking system is granted in time of financial stress. Regarding the estimated coefficient for Supervisory power, it predicts that powerful supervisory national systems reduce implicit public interventions and imposes rather bail-in practices through shareholders and creditors mobilization. Higher values for this variable suggest greater intervention and sanction power of the supervisor, reducing expectation that public authorities will provide a bail-out if banks are in distress. Each of these factors does not interfere with the effect of public effort to implement a resolution scheme as it is shown by the estimated coefficients in each alternative regression. To conclude this last section of our empirical analysis, the willingness of European governments seems to affect significantly the amount of implicit guarantees for banks' debt. This intervenes as an additional effect to the banks' demand for support and the guarantor capacity to provide this financial support. Historical structure of each national banking system also accounts for the distribution of public guarantees, however it does not fit in the effect of resolution practices which remains unquestionable.
The issue presented in this section has an increased interest under the current circumstances of coordination and harmonization of national supervisory authorities at European level.
As the first pillar of the future Banking Union, the European Central Bank should be the unique supervisor for European banks. New stress tests and regulatory standards are to be implemented in order to ensure a better capitalization and liquidity for banking and financial system. The main objective is to definitively immunize governments against bank risks. In this way, the cost of rescuing will also affect investors and not only taxpayers. This unfinished business could weigh heavily on the willingness of European governments to support their banking systems in case of high stress. For instance, as regulatory mechanisms are not permanently defined 18 , public guarantees persist, however their value is continuously decreasing. The institutional advances at a European level should be based on a sure and credible national background in order to be productive. Without a strict national legislation that gives priority to bail-in and limit governments' willingness to support their national banking system, public guarantee may persist as well as system distortions and moral hazard phenomenon.
18 In UK reform progress called Vickers and at European level, the ongoing project Liikanen (2012).
Conclusion
The increased interest for implicit public guarantees for bank risky debt emerged especially from the reaction of government to financial stress starting from 2007. Massive amounts of public resources were "offered" to banking systems in order to avoid spillovers and a worst degradation for banks' funding structure and also for the whole economic activity.
However, these injections were very controversial given their impact on public debt and taxpayers. Our study quantifies the value of public subsidies for a sample of large listed European banks using a rating based approach. Using Moody's ratings, we evaluate the government intervention expectations to support banks in distress as a notches saving, materialized in a better rating than the one corresponding to their intrinsic strength. guarantees is weaker. In the second section, we prove that the value of implicit guarantees depends also on the characteristics of the guarantor (government). The reduction in the value of implicit guarantees matches with the decreasing strength of European governments during the sovereign crisis that started in 2010. We thus conclude that the value of implicit public guarantees decreases with the strength of the bank and increases with the strength of the guarantor. Although, beyond the direct impact of the financial strength of the guarantor (sovereign) to support bank debt, there is a new dimension of the "supply" of implicit guarantees related to the willingness of the government to intervene in order to save banks from bankruptcy. We demonstrate that new regulatory and resolution schemes proposed by the national European supervisors and also by the European Commission go beyond the declining financial strength of the sovereign and significantly reduce the probability of future bail-outs for banks. Our results bring significant evidence on the main determinants of implicit subsidies offered to banks. Banks are bailout if their balance sheet is weakened balance sheet in time of distress; however sovereign financial strength is essential in supporting the domestic banking system. The regulatory and resolution measures under implementation could weigh heavily on the willingness of European governments to support their banking systems in case of high stress. Moreover, they promote shareholders and creditors capitalization in order to restore market discipline by aligning bank funding costs more closely with risks. A further objective of the resolution mechanism concerns the breaking of the observed loop between bank and sovereign debt. There may be a distance to travel before public implicit subsidies will be eliminated, although turning them into more explicit guarantees can reduce distortions and moral hazard and also improve market discipline. In order to give more relevant values for implicit guarantee, they should be "converted" in funding interest rate advantage. However, bonds rates for each bank in our sample are not available, only aggregated indexes for European banks which are not relevant. We hope that future research will develop and use more appropriate data in order to estimate the debt funding rate advantage due to implicit guarantees and so, bring sharper evidence on this issue.
6 Appendix 6.1 Appendix A Structural index evaluating the supervisor's intervention and sanction power Levine, 2001 ab, 2003) . For our sample, it takes values between -1.8 and 1, with higher values indicating greater power.
Market discipline
Measures the ability of private agents to supervise the banking sector. It assesses the quality of information provided by the banks, the deposit insurance scheme and the role of subordinated debt in bank funding structure (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2003) . It takes values between -0.43 and 1.46. Lower values correspond to greater transparency of the activity.
Creditors rights
Structural index for each European country that aggregates different creditor rights (rights in bankruptcy situation or in a business reorganization, etc). It ranges from 0 to 4.
Appendix B

Ratings definition
Global rating: Moody's Long Term Deposit rating (foreign currency)
Bank Long-term Deposit ratings represent Moody's forward-looking opinion on a bank's ability to repay punctually its foreign currency deposit obligations. It also reflects the expected financial loss in the case of default. Bank Deposit Ratings do not apply to deposits that are subject to a public or private insurance scheme; rather, the ratings apply to uninsured deposits, but they may in some cases incorporate the possibility that official support might in certain cases extend to uninsured as well as insured deposits (Moody's Investors Service, 2013) . Global long-term ratings scale provides 25 alpha-numerical values going from Aaa (highest quality) to C3 (lowest rating) (cf table below). Ratings exclude the external factors specified above, they could take into account other risk factors in the bank's operating environment (for example the strength and prospective performance of the economy, the anticipated fragility of the financial system). Bank Financial Strength Ratings are expressed on an A to E scale and where appropriate a "+" or "-" specifies the intensity of the rating. There is a strong probability for these banks to ask for E-14 an external support in order to avoid bankruptcy.
Note: Where appropriate, a "+" modifier will be appended to ratings below the "A" category and a "-" modifier will be appended to ratings above the "E" category to distinguish those banks that fall in intermediate categories. 6.3 Appendix C Notes: The dependent variable is the implicit guarantee. Estimations include bank fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
